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EXCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL AUTOPOIESIS:
TOWARDS A THEORY OF DIALECTICAL POSITIVISM*
By Oles Andriychuk, Stirling
I. Introduction
In spite of a relatively short period of popularity in the 1980s–1990s,
legal autopoiesis is not amongst the most debated theories in contempor-
ary jurisprudence. On the methodological side, this loss of interest was,
to some extent, predetermined by its sociological origins, metaphorical
apparatus, the complexity of Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems
and its stylistic density.1 From the normative perspective, the gist of cri-
ticism and disapproval among legal scholars could be narrowed down to
their scepticism towards the autopoiesis’ motto: law as a self-referential
system. Taken superficially, the self-referential character of law breaks
the ‘taboo of circularity’,2 endangering in some sense the very idea of
democratic governance. It would be a trivial task, however, to demon-
strate that the closeness of the system of legal norms has an operational
character and is intrinsically connected to its openness. This issue has
been explicitly articulated by the founders of legal autopoiesis in their
reply to accusations that autopoiesis is a revival of some type of autar-
chic solipsism of law.3
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and Dr. Axelle Reiter for their comments on a draft of this paper.
1 E.g. N. Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, in: G. Teubner (ed.), Autop-
oietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society, Berlin 1987, p. 15: “[T]he system
must [. . .] always be able to re-negate the constantly concomitant, constantly im-
plied negations. The law-code of legal and illegal is [. . .] nothing but the correlate
of a self-referential mode of operation which reproduces itself according to this
code.”
2 G. Teubner, Introduction, in: id. (ed.), Autopoietic Law (note 1), p. 1.
3 N. Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentia-
tion of the Legal System, in: Cardozo Law Review 13 (1992), p. 1420: “[T]he theory
of autopoietic, self-reproducing systems does not reinvent the idea of complete
self-causation in empirical isolation. [. . .] This should be obvious. The description
of a system as autopoietic, as autonomous, as operationally closed, refers to the
network of its operations and not to the totality of all empirical conditions, that
is, the world. The question is not how a system can maintain itself without any
environmental support. Rather, it is what kind of operations enable a system to
form a self-reproducing network which relies exclusively on self-generated in-
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I do not intend in this paper to trace the evolution of autopoiesis in
law and its eventual decline. My primary objective is to offer dialectical
account of the discussion about the essence of law, as takes place be-
tween legal positivism and non-positivism using autopoietic analysis of
law as a means in support of legal positivism. I develop my arguments in
4 sections. After the introductory notes, which set the overall tasks of the
paper, Section II provides a brief description of the theory of social sys-
tems, analysing the principle of autopoiesis and its repercussion on the
system of law and highlights the main research agenda of exclusive posi-
tivism (I will also use the term exclusivism). Section III articulates in
more details the main problems related to law’s incorporation of moral-
ity, providing a theoretical background for the theory of dialectical posi-
tivism (I will address the meaning of dialectics and dialectical positivism
in Section IV), which is subsequently applied in Section IV to the issues
of the indeterminacy of the law, legal interpretation and argumentation.
These objectives could appear ambiguous to the critics of legal positi-
vism and to its supporters alike: doctrinal narratives are seldom invigo-
rated by the implementation of elements borrowed from other theories.
Potential confusions and discord constitute only the tip of the possible
Tower of Babel. In addition, any attempt to combine established theories
should pass between the Scylla of superficiality and Charybdis of tech-
nicality. I am aware of this difficulty and my task is to substantiate the
reinforcing role of autopoiesis for the agenda of exclusive legal positi-
vism by developing a theory which I label dialectical positivism, the the-
ory which synthesises the positions of exclusivism and autopoiesis and
constitutes a common denominator of both. This paper seeks to synthe-
sise, and not to syncretise, autopoiesis and exclusive positivism. Both
theories are deeply rooted in two parallel discussions (taking place in
sociology of law and jurisprudence respectively), and it is hard to use
them interchangeably without creating additional confusion. For this
reason, I will try to articulate their mutually supportive elements in a
very explicit and clear manner and I will mainly remain within the am-
bits of the suggested theory of dialectical positivism; which will even-
tually entail a certain amount of stylisation.
II. Autopoietic Law and Legal Positivism
Legal theory addresses primarily the ontological issue of what is law,
while the social systems theory of autopoiesis focuses on operational
formation and is capable of distinguishing internal needs from what it sees as en-
vironmental problems.”
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questions related to how law positions itself in respect to other systems
of social norms and how law interacts with these systems. My hypothesis
is that these two approaches are inseparably linked to each other, and
this connection enables the comparative synergetic analysis of law from
both legal theoretical and social systematic angles. The main research
problems and apparatus of both theories remain different and my syn-
thetic theory of dialectical positivism does not aim at the elimination
of these differences, seeking only to demonstrate the compatibility (the
minimum task of the paper) and mutual strengthening (the maximum
task of the paper) of their premises.
In the following two subsections I will very briefly recapitulate the
main features of both theories. These subsections can be omitted by
those who are familiar with their research agenda. My main arguments
are mostly developed in Section III and contextualised in Section IV.
1. Autopoietic Law as an Epistemological Construct
In the Introduction I pointed out a very common misperception of au-
topoiesis in law. Its closure is often perceived claustrophobically: as if it
is a claim that law should be isolated from other social systems, living
its own life, independently from the context. This impression is wrong,
but the basic principles of autopoiesis indeed can provoke such conclu-
sion. The autopoietic idea of self-referentiality in law is a synthetic epis-
temological construct. Its synthetic character implies some conditionality
of the theoretical premises of autopoiesis. Autopoiesis is a vision of the
functional coexistence of social systems. It does not claim exclusivity,
but it does claim universality. If one does accept the premises of the
autopoietic analysis, one will have no other choice than to extend them
to all processes taking place in society (the universality clause of the
methodological purism), but one does not necessarily have to accept or
use this theoretical language (the non-exclusivity clause).
It is well known, that the term autopoiesis (self-creation) has been de-
veloped in biology,4 and referred to the self-generative mechanisms of
living systems, namely biological cells. Niklas Luhmann then applied the
concept to social systems.5 Metaphorically speaking, autopoiesis always
implies thinking inside the box. Similar to biological systems, every so-
cial system – be it law, economics, morality, religion, art or, say, football,
Exclusive Legal Positivism and Legal Autopoiesis 3
4 H. Maturana/F. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Liv-
ing, Dordrecht 1972.
5 N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (translated by E. King-Utz and
M. Albrow), London 1985.
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is primarily interested in maintaining some coherence between its own
elements. It interacts with other systems through special codes, encoding
the information, sent to other systems, and decoding the information
received from those systems. These coupling points are the only way to
achieve meaningful interaction between the system and the remaining
environment. The systems’ requirements can be neglected, skipped or
abandoned, but nothing can be imposed forcefully upon the system with-
out special coupling mechanisms. As a computer would not understand
commands unless they are written in a special programmatic language,
law remains ignorant to anything, which is not translated into legal
terms, using the special legally meaningful algorithms: this is what is
meant by the system’s ‘operational closure’. In this sense, law’s only op-
erational task is “continuous making possible of self, from moment to
moment, from event to event, from case to case and it is designed pre-
cisely to have no end”.6 The communication between the systems (or
more precisely, the communication of the systems about each other)7 is
ubiquitous, and this is why the operational closure is always accompa-
nied by their ‘functional openness’. The closure-openness characteristics
of law can be perceived in their dialectical dependency,8 which deter-
mine the numerous dualities in law. Let me highlight the most important
of these dualities.
In one of the best concise descriptions of the nature of legal auto-
poiesis in the English-speaking literature Michael King explains two im-
portant dualities of legal autopoiesis: (i) the dual representation of indi-
viduals, which is characterised by their simultaneous presence as parts
of social autopoietic systems and their own existence as autopoietic sys-
tems in the biological and the physical senses of the terms; and (ii) the
fact that autopoietic systems are simultaneously separate from society
(environment) and a component of it.9 At the meta-level all these systems
constitute societal subsystems.10 The steering of different systems cannot
be anything else than another, more complex, system.11 Another impor-
4 Oles Andriychuk
6 Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System (note 1), p. 20.
7 K. Van Assche/G. Verschraegen, The Limits of Planning: Niklas Luhmann’s
Systems Theory and the Analysis of Planning and Planning Ambitions, in: Plan-
ning Theory 7 (2008), p. 270.
8 M. Van De Kerchove/F. Ost, Legal System Between Order and Disorder, Ox-
ford 1994, pp. 92–94.
9 M. King, The ‘Truth’ About Autopoiesis, in: Journal of Law and Society 20
(1993), p. 220.
10 N. Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentia-
tion of the Legal System, in: Cardozo Law Review 13 (1992), pp. 1424–1425.
11 In this respect autopoiesis has some conceptual similarities with Scott Sha-
piro’s version of exclusivism, namely, his social planning theory, which demon-
12/6/15 12:54  Rechtstheorie, Duncker (21116_Andriychuk.3d (E)) 4 
tant dialectical duality of autopoiesis is observed by François Ewald. For
him legal autopoiesis is an attempt to mitigate ‘the radical split’ between
the external (sociological paradigm of law – what he calls ‘the last epi-
gones of the jusnaturalist doctrines’) and the internal perceptions of law
(Kelsen’s normativism; essentialism and positivism in general): the split,
which polarised the twentieth century jurisprudence. In this sense auto-
poiesis is seen as ‘both post-Kelsen and post-sociological’.12 Ultimately,
François Ost refers to the last important duality of autopoiesis: namely,
the dialectics of regularity and chance or determinism and indetermin-
ism. It generates two important consequences: First, the decision-making
process can never take place mechanically. Adjudication is not a logical
automatism. Even leaving aside the inevitable elements of subjectivity,
law always contains more than what has been deduced from it in any
given legal case. Secondly, the systemic closeness of law cannot be over-
come by the internal rationale of other social systems (e. g. by economic
rationality, political necessity or moral virtue). Ost explains that “what
appears as noise, chance or perturbation to the outside observer is in
some way intelligible to or decidable by the system”,13 which implies
that what may well appear to be morally good or economically rational
does not necessarily have to be accepted by law. Conversely, what seems
to be morally bad or economically unsound may well be determined by
law’s own special program. The first aspect of Ost’s observation will be
explored in more details in analysing law’s polysemic nature (subsections
1/III and 2/IV of this paper), law as a game (4/III) and judges’ ‘bounded
arbitrariness’ in deciding hard cases (2/IV). His latter duality will be of
direct relevance for the analysis of interactions between operationally
closed systems (2–3/III).
2. Exclusive Legal Positivism
One of the major difficulties in describing exclusive legal positivism is
its parallel development through several streams. Despite sharing the
overall claim of the conceptual separation of law and morality (the se-
paration thesis), its two most representative contemporary versions (Kel-
Exclusive Legal Positivism and Legal Autopoiesis 5
strates the implicit compatibility of exclusivism and autopoiesis: compare S. J.
Shapiro, Law, Morality and the Guidance of Conduct, in: Legal Theory 6 (2000),
pp. 128–131; id., Was Inclusive Legal Positivism Founded on a Mistake?, in: Ratio
Juris 22 (2009), pp. 326–328; id., Legality, in: Harvard University Press 2011 with
Q Q Q Van Assche/Verschraegen, The Limits of Planning (note 7), pp. 270–275.
12 F. Ewald, The Law of Law, in: Teubner (ed.), Autopoietic Law (note 1),
pp. 39–41.
13 F. Ost, Between Order and Disorder: The Game of Law, in: Teubner (ed.), Au-
topoietic Law (note 1), pp. 78–79.
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senian and Razian) substantially diverge in their methodological appara-
tus, being sometimes more critical of each other (and their predecessor –
classical positivism) than of their direct (jusnaturalism) and latent (in-
clusivism) opponents. The literature on both exclusivist trends is so rich
and comprehensive that it is hardly possible to make any general exclu-
sivist claim without reverting to the numerous and very detailed discus-
sions on the pros and cons of that claim. Since the objective of this sub-
section is to highlight the basic principles of exclusivism for further
operationalisation purposes, I will not address polemical points in this
context, in spite of their direct relevance to the highlighted theses of ex-
clusivism.
The main principles of exclusivism are founded upon (but are not lim-
ited to) the writings of such philosophers as Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy
Bentham and John Austin. The latest is known for providing the most
stylised summary of this theory: ‘[t]he existence of law is one thing; its
merit or demerit is another’.14 The term exclusivism as such was neces-
sary to develop in order to distinguish those positivists who continue to
subscribe to the separation thesis from those who recognize that some
legal systems can either explicitly or indirectly include a proxy for the
imperative role of morality in law (inclusive legal positivism or inclusi-
vism). Wil Waluchow, who coined the term as such, defines it as “the
claim that moral considerations can, but need not, figure properly in de-
terminations of law, i. e., attempts to determine the existence or content
of valid laws”.15 Judging from the literature, the majority of legal positi-
vists are inclusivists. The positions of inclusivists are not united either,
but most of them agree that laws – at least in developed liberal democra-
cies – cannot be defined and/or legal decisions made without some moral
imput.
The definition of morality itself constitutes an important topic in con-
temporary jurisprudence. Most of the authors acknowledge that morality
as understood in legal theory presents features that distinguish it from
the notion of commonsense morality. The definition matters. If by moral-
ity one understands the genuine meaning behinds the letter of the law,
this approach would not be at odds with the position of most exclu-
sivists. Conversely, if the conception of morality endorsed is taken from
outside of the legal field – namely, from the semantic meaning of the
moral category, ideological convictions of the interpreters or religious be-
liefs – this approach would be at odds with exclusive positivism.
6 Oles Andriychuk
14 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, London 1995, p. 157.
15 W. J. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism, Oxford 1994, p. 166, emphasis
added.
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One must clarify that no positivist denies the relevance of this broader
definition of morality as such. John Gardner calls this misunderstanding
absurd, clarifying that “no legal philosopher of note has ever endorsed it
as it stands”.16 Hans Kelsen, who was the object of such line of criticism
pointed out: “my theory of law [. . .] has nothing to do with my political
attitude as a liberal democrat”.17 What exclusivism objects to in differ-
ent ways is the ability of morality to define the law. In the following sec-
tion I will address the issue in more details, arguing specifically in sub-
section 1/III that the real dividing line between morality and law can be
drawn upon the ‘homonymy-polysemy’ criterion.
These fruitful discussions emerged from the debates between H. L. A.
Hart and Ronald Dworkin. The latter philosopher criticise Hart’s account
of positivism and introduced the notion of gapless law: even in the most
controversial cases there is always either a real or at least a hypothetical
right answer, which should be discovered and followed by the judge. The
essence of hard cases will be addressed in subsection 2/IV. Leaving aside
my strong disagreement with Dworkin’s conception of the role of moral-
ity in searching for the right legal answer, the overall picture of law that
this paper puts forward is compatible with the Dworkinian notion of
gapless law. Yet, unlike Dworkin’s theory, it does not rely on extra-legal
elements of morality. Let me now revert to the problematic relations be-
tween law and morality.
III. Relations between Law and Morality
Prima facie the idea that law – as any other social system – can define
its own way of communicating with the environment (i. e. with other so-
cial systems like morality or economics) implies that it can explicitly ac-
cept morality’s steering role. This is consonant with the inclusive legal
positivism: implying that some (mature, democratic, humanistic) societies
acknowledge the boundaries (seen as limitedness) of law as a social sys-
tem and overcome law’s self-referentiality by explicitly accepting the
principles of morality/justice as guiding benchmarks for the functioning
of the law. The problem with this approach resides in its over-inclusive
aim. From an autopoietic perspective, inclusive legal positivism is always
over-inclusivism. Indeed, social systems define their communication
codes with other systems, but they cannot overcome the natural bound-
Exclusive Legal Positivism and Legal Autopoiesis 7
16 J. Gardner, Legal Positivism: 51/2 Myths, in: American Journal of Jurispru-
dence 46 (2001), p. 223.
17 H. Kelsen/A. A. Ehrenzweig, Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law, in:
Stanford Law Review 17 (1965), p. 1135.
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aries organically present in each system. A legal norm saying that “every
legally meaningful action should be performed in accordance with the
principles of justice” cannot establish overall justice. Structurally, it is
identical to the norm in the Soviet Constitution which declared that
“The supreme goal of the Soviet state is the building of a classless com-
munist society in which there will be public, communist self-govern-
ment”; in the sense that both statements are divorced from reality and
merely constitute some form of wishful thinking. The content of what is
desirable differs from one society to the next, while its legal structure
remains identical. The natural boundaries of social systems prevent them
from self-destruction (in Luhmann’s terms – from ‘de-differentiation’).
Let me explain what the de-differentiation implies. A legal norm guar-
anteeing ultimate justice for everyone, can either remain a mere declara-
tory manifestation, with no or only sporadic legal effect, or should define
justice in restrictive terms, limiting it to legal apparatus. The former op-
tion does not fulfil the legal standards of predictability and certainty
(although it could be adjusted to the notion of indeterminacy and inter-
pretation of law to which I will revert in Section IV). The latter scenario
transfers the concept of justice from the domain of morality to the do-
main of law, creating a confusing homonymy between these two con-
cepts. This second approach falls in the trap, to which the natural law
theories are very susceptible. In a stylised form, jusnaturalism claims
that the principles of justice are mentioned explicitly in (developed) legal
systems, and that the concept of justice is of a moral nature. Accordingly,
(i) law is connected to morality and (ii) the legal meaning of the concept
of justice is embedded into its moral meaning. The tiny difference be-
tween jusnaturalists and inclusivists is based upon the origins of such
embeddedness: while the former argue for the organic, predetermined
connection of law to morality, the latter accept it only as an intentional
act of some law-makers (or law-enforcers). The opposite idea, which sug-
gests that the self-identification of a legal system does not imply its om-
nipotence, is conceptually connected with the exclusivist version of posi-
tivism, which argues that morality cannot steer the law even if the steer-
ing role is declared in legal texts (i. e. that law cannot step beyond its
limits). I will revert to the problem of such incorporation in subsection
4/III.
1. Homonymy vs. Polysemy
To demonstrate the implications of the jusnaturalist and the inclusivist
over-inclusiveness (namely, that they include into the concept of law
more than the law can digest), the distinction between homonymy and
polysemy should be put forward.
8 Oles Andriychuk
12/6/15 12:54  Rechtstheorie, Duncker (21116_Andriychuk.3d (E)) 8 
Homonymy is a situation where two different concepts have an identi-
cal spelling and pronunciation.18 It does not represent a big difficulty in
cases where the concepts are unrelated to each other and only share lin-
guistic properties. But the potential for confusion becomes higher, the
closer the concepts become semantically.
If the concepts share also the same etymology and are used inter-
changeably (polysemy), the boundaries between them become blurred,
yet the unarticulated differences between the concepts are not elimi-
nated. In spite of the fact that the terms homonymy and polysemy are
not necessarily contradictory and that the features of homonymy are
partly shared by the notion of polysemy, they shall be used antagonisti-
cally for the purposes of this paper.
Namely, homonymy reflects situations, where two phonetically identi-
cal concepts are used by different social systems (e. g. the use of the term
‘justice’ in law, moral theory or economics), while polysemy occurs when
the concept (e. g. of justice) is used within each of these systems.19
Homonymy does not mandate reconciliation of incompatible concepts
that share a common spelling and pronunciation, since they exist in par-
allel. Conversely, polysemy requires such reconciliation. I imply that the
notions of justice discussed separately in legal, political, economic or
moral theories are in a situation of homonymy in respect to each other,
while the different perceptions and interpretations of the notion of jus-
tice inside each system of social norms (i. e. in law, politics, economics or
morality) are polysemic. This is a stylised hypothesis. I do not argue that
the concepts of justice as perceived in different systems of social norms
share nothing but spelling and pronunciation. What I argue is that they
are non-transferable from one domain to another without special en-
coding/decoding protocol. Let me explain the implications of this hypo-
thesis.
The main discrepancy between exclusivism and jusnaturalism lies in
exclusivism’s claims that the term justice – as well as any other concept
present both in moral and legal theories – can have both homonymic and
polysemic features. Exclusivism requires judges to restrict their analysis
solely to polysemy situations (i. e. to different legal interpretations of the
considered concepts) and to ignore all homonymous overlaps in the con-
Exclusive Legal Positivism and Legal Autopoiesis 9
18 One can prefer to use the term isomorphism instead (S. L. Paulson, Introduc-
tion, in: id./Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (eds.), Normativity and Norms: Critical
Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, Oxford 1998, p. xli).
19 To my knowledge, the clearest articulation of the problem of homonymy in
legal positivism has been offered in D. Priel, Farewell to the Exclusive – Inclusive
Debate, in: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 25 (2005).
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cept of justice (i. e. the interpretation of which is provided from extra-
legal sources).20 Conversely, jusnaturalism does not consider the concept
of justice as homonymous at all: justice is universal; it is not particular,
not system-specific, in other words. Justice for jusnaturalism can be
either a mono- or a poly-semic concept. Jusnaturalist theories that ac-
cept some polysemy of the notion of justice can be labelled pluralistic,
while those that do not and argue instead for the existence of a single
right definition of justice can be called monistic. Both argue for the
moral nature of law, but while the former accepts disagreement on what
this moral nature constitutes of in each case, the latter does not.
In the same vein, apropos, exclusivist theories can also be divided
along such lines. Statutory positivism, which restricts the analysis either
to the original intentions of the law-makers or the literal reading of sta-
tutes, is an example of monistic positivism. On the other side, theories
that accept (either as an unavoidability, a desirability or both) the impor-
tance of interpretation, which can change the implications of legal texts
without changing their meaning or their status as legal texts, operate
within a pluralistic exclusivist discourse. Both versions of exclusivism
reject the relevance of homonymous aspects of justice, arguing either for
its monosemic (i. e. statutory positivism) or polysemic (i. e. those who ac-
cept the necessity of legal interpretation) perception. I subscribe to the
latter version of exclusivism.21
2. Clashes between Systems
The difficulties in defining the proper borders of legal concepts are not
only attributable to the relations between legal and moral theory. The
theory of autopoiesis provides a theoretical framework, which helps to
identify communicative clashes between various systems of social norms.
Conflicts are unavoidable in this respect. One could look at the relations
between law and economics as an example. Although the literature on
10 Oles Andriychuk
20 H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, New York 1973, p. 8: “Since
humanity is divided into many nations, classes, religions, professions and so on,
often at variance with one another, there are a great many very different ideas of
justice; too many for one to be able to speak simply of justice.”
21 Owen Fiss (O. M. Fiss, The Varieties of Positivism, in: The Yale Law Journal
90 (1981), pp. 1007–1009) distinguishes between the two realms of legal positivism:
(i) ethical and (ii) cognitive. The former aspect of positivity refers to the separa-
tion thesis, while the latter (a) addresses the actual behaviour of people and insti-
tutions and (b) accentuates on the empirically verifiable evidences. Only the sec-
ond mode of legal positivism has its strong links with the Vienna Circle positivism
as a general scientific movement (with empirical studies being positivism par ex-
cellence). In my view, one can be a positivist in one sense without being positivist
in the other. I adhere only to the former version of positivism.
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the theoretical aspects of the conflict between legal and economic analy-
sis is not as rich as the discussion between positivism and jusnaturalism
(probably, because law and economics tends to concentrate on practical
rather than theoretical problems), it still exhibits similar features as the
discussion between exclusivism and jusnaturalism.
Authors in the law and economics tradition support, in general, the
claim that law can be best interpreted as an extension and formalisation
of economic relations. Therefore economic theory is the most appropriate
place both for defining the incentives of the participants in the legal dis-
course and for describing their behaviour (positive economic analysis).
Since economics is the theory which understands best the essence of con-
duct in the past, it is consequently the best theory for prescribing future
conducts (normative economic analysis). In this sense, the law and eco-
nomics movement is another version of jusnaturalism: its jusnaturalism
differs from the one that is grounded in moral theories, since it argues
that legal relations are a special, formalised incarnation of economic
(and not moral) relations. But conceptually they converge: both moral
and economic theories argue that the best explanation of law derives
from the external sources (morality and economics respectively), the
sources which are natural in this sense.22
Again, different law and economics schools can be either pluralistic or
monistic naturalists. Pluralists argue that while economics is indeed the
only answer to legal problems, economics itself is yet not united in what
exactly these right answers should be. Therefore, different economic the-
ories can compete for providing the best answer to legal problems (e. g.
on the right the Chicago school criticises legal positivism for its inability
to provide proper wealth maximisation, while on the left the socio-legal
literature criticises it for preventing proper wealth distribution), but all
these law and economics theories would agree that the answer should be
given by economics. Some orthodox normative economic schools (e. g.
some versions of Marxism or libertarianism) belong to monistic jusnatur-
alism: not only would they argue that the answer should be given by eco-
nomics, but also that the economic answer is known only to those – and
not other – economic schools.
From the perspective of systems theory, the law and economics move-
ment appears as a natural and organic expansion of one social system to
Exclusive Legal Positivism and Legal Autopoiesis 11
22 It is probably possible in this respect to make an argument that all jusnatur-
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another. This is an objective process, since every discipline seeks for co-
herence; and coherence “is inherently expansive: It resists compartmen-
talization and seeks to encompass as much as possible”.23 Its genuine
meaning and its real intention would be better captured not by the ‘law
and economics’ label, but rather called ‘law as economics (sees it)’. Eco-
nomics is not unique in this respect: law itself, by regulating economic
relations, intervenes and affects the realm of the economic social system,
creating numerous discrepancies between a purely economic thinking
and its legal explications, giving a technical legal definition to purely
economic concepts. In this sense for a long time all lawyers were implicit
representatives of an articulated but very powerful ‘economics and/as
law’ movement. “[D]isciplines [. . . compete] for limited space [. . .,] have
‘interest’ in their own reproduction and spread.”24
The same occurs in the relations between law and morality. For the
purposes of this paper, jusnaturalists can be perceived to belong to a
‘law and morality’ movement, whose ultimate intention is to reduce it to
‘law as morality’. In the same vein, legal realists and critical legal scho-
lars can be perceived as different versions of the ‘law as politics’ move-
ment, etc. From the perspective of systems theory, all these approaches
can be taken as external perceptions of the law, while the purely legal
autopoietic discourse would solely encompass various versions of exclu-
sive legal positivism.
Since most of the external perceptions of law are driven by their own
disciplinary and research interests, they tend to ignore the existence of
different external approaches, and often conflict with each other. The in-
clinations and methods of each system (be it politics, morals or econom-
ics) are different. They often collide. To use another stylisation, one can
argue that moral theorists operate in terms of fairness and justice, while
economists are more comfortable with cost-benefits approach. A majority
of moral philosophers pay high attention to the deontological, non-cal-
culable aspects of values, while most economists are consequentialists.
Thus, such legal fields as constitutional law are colonised by moral the-
ory, while commercial or antitrust law are dominated by economics. A
consequentialist cost-benefits argument would be hard to put forward
when discussing issues of rights, while a deontological approach is diffi-
cult to develop within the discourse of competition law. Morality and
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23 E. J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, in: The
Yale Law Journal 97 (1988), p. 972.
24 J. M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonisation, in: Washington and Lee Law
Review 53 (1995), p. 960; D. Kennedy, Legal Formality, in: The Journal of Legal
Studies 2 (1973), p. 356: “[T]heories tend to try to expand their scope to cover as
much of reality as possible.”
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economics feel comfortable in their colonised areas of law, but both sys-
tems tend to expand to the realm of other legal branches as well. Then
the mutual neglect is replaced by the mutual refutation: economics is ac-
cused by morality for its excessive pragmatism and the tendency to com-
modify even the most morally significant values of life, freedom or
autonomy, while morality is accused by economics for its declaratory the-
oretical claims which undermine efficiency and optimisation. As any do-
main, invaded by two strangers, law often behaves opportunistically in
this respect, trying to use rational economic arguments in its liberation
movement from morality, and the language of morals against economic
expansion; which further complicates the problem of the definition of
boundaries. In both cases – i. e. when morality and economics remain
within their colonised branches of law (constitutional law for morality or
competition law for economics), as well as (and more explicitly) in cases
of cross-expansion in legal fields colonised by each other –, they remain
external to the law itself.
Legal autopoiesis and exclusivism can be seen as law’s attempts to
1) articulate; 2) defend and 3) expand its own realm. These processes are
described by autopoiesis and it would be a grotesque misrepresentation
to personify or generalise them: they implicitly exist in any social sys-
tem, and every jusnaturalist, who recognises that a legal norm should be
followed in spite of its bad consequences, acts as an exclusivist in this
respect. Let me revert now to the very functioning of the autopoietic me-
chanism.
3. Encoding-decoding and the Problem of the Centre of Gravity
One of the main principles of systems theory is the premise that the
same information can be processed simultaneously by different codes.
This implies that some human relations can at the same time be morally,
politically, economically and legally meaningful. Each discipline or each
social system internalises some parts of these relations, which does not
prevent their internalisation by other social systems. This leads to the
situation, where some actions are at the same time regulated or ad-
dressed by several normative systems. The task of each system in its in-
teractions with its environment is to decode (or translate) the multiple
external signals into the language or codes known by the system. This
objective is known metaphorically as the creation of an internal order
from the external noise. Law, as a social system, is perpetually involved
in this process. It addresses numerous problems, which are, at the same
time, addressed by other social systems. The effectiveness of the decod-
ing process is directly related to the mastery of the interpreters (namely,
Exclusive Legal Positivism and Legal Autopoiesis 13
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how good the discourse of morality, economics, politics and the like are
perceived by law-makers and law-enforcers) and how relevant the trans-
ferred information is to the realm of law. However, this decoding process
usually gives rise to ‘unforeseen distortions and reductions to the mean-
ing of the original communications as they were formulated in the politi-
cal or economic systems’.25
The better the communicative process goes, the smother the relations
between the systems. However, even inappropriate or wicked translations
produce the same meaningful consequences for the system, since its
knowledge about the environment is limited to the information it re-
ceives from the translators. Bad translations complicate interactions
with other discourses, but they do not affect their internal status within
the system, in which they are transferred. Thus, if law reflects properly
the dominant vision of economics or morality, these social systems coex-
ist harmoniously with no or only minimal discrepancies. As a corollary
of this communicative success, situations can arise where one system
claims influence on another in a direct way, without the assistance of the
decoders: in such cases, moral or economic theories would perceive them-
selves as the ultimate decision-makers for the legal system, not only
‘knowing better’ what the law is but also what it should be.
The metaphor of good and the bad translations is yet another necessary
stylisation, since in practice neither can happen. Any normative system
is bound to trust all the information it receives from the interpreters,
since the interpreters are the only sensor, through which it perceives the
external world.26 This implies that legal theoretical analysis is mostly
interested in the process of decoding of the external information, making
this information meaningful for the law – since it is the only source,
from which law absorbs information about its environment. Any infor-
mation decoded through legal translation is incorporated into the law,
thereby transforming itself into law. Hans Kelsen compares law in this
respect to King Midas: “just as everything he touched turned to gold, so
everything to which the law refers assumes legal.”27 In this sense law –
as well as any other normative system – is only interested in its autopoie-
tic existence, and not in the effectiveness of the overall communicative
processes between different systems – a task, which is either purely ob-
servational or meta-managerial (steering), but not an internal objective
14 Oles Andriychuk
25 M. King, The ‘Truth’ About Autopoiesis, in: Journal of Law and Society 20
(1993), p. 226.
26 Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling (note 3), pp. 1432–
1434.
27 H. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley 1967 (Reprint Series Edition,
1978), p. 278.
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of the law. This does not entail the entire autonomy or closeness of each
system, but merely negates the possibility of their communication with-
out translators (a position which would be defended by inclusive positi-
vists, as will be explained in the following subsection).
4. Law and the Im-/possibility of the Faustian Pact
As underlined above, every system operates within its natural, organic
boundaries, and this implies that not every claim made by the system
can be absorbed or digested by the system itself. This is the main argu-
ment against inclusive legal positivism, which allows direct incorpora-
tion of morality into the law. Exclusive legal positivism, on the contrary,
does not accept this situation, arguing that law cannot be guided by
rules, originating in other social systems. In such situations, the external
rules were in fact decoded and absorbed by the law (like for the ‘Thou
Shalt not Kill’ principle incorporated in a criminal codex). Essentially
the main difference between inclusive and exclusive positivism is that
the former tolerates the Faustian Pact28 by which law can voluntarily
accept the normative primacy of other social systems (be it morality or
economics) without any internal decoding being constantly involved.
The typical example provided by inclusive positivists refers to the pro-
visions of democratic constitutions or international treaties, in which the
dominant role of some moral principles (e.g. human rights or justice) is
explicitly recognised.29 An identical situation occurs in antitrust law,
where competition lawyers accept that some economic issues should be
determined and regulated by economic theories, e.g. industrial organisa-
tion theory, behavioural economics etc., provided that law (or legal prac-
tice) explicitly tolerates it. For the exclusivists, on the contrary, such re-
cognition is never a Faustian Pact. Two ways of argumentation (norma-
tive and descriptive) are possible in this respect, which differ only in
terms of style and put forward virtually identical claims. The first sce-
nario is provided by Joseph Raz in his ‘Incorporation by Law’. Raz ex-
plains that the fact that the law contains some direct acknowledgement
of various non-legal norms does not render these norms legal. References
to these standards merely give them ‘legal effect without turning them
into part of the law of the land’.30 This is a stylised representation of the
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with the metaphor is irrelevant.
29 W. J. Waluchow, Herculean Positivism, in: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 5
(1985), p. 195.
30 J. Raz, Incorporation by Law, in: id., Between Authority and Interpretation,
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12/6/15 12:54  Rechtstheorie, Duncker (21116_Andriychuk.3d (E)) 15 
classical normative argument of exclusivism. The descriptive argument
derives from legal sociology, namely from systems theory, and emphasises
the autopoietic nature of the law. It is fully compatible with the norma-
tive argument but puts more emphasis on the general theoretical model-
ling, the natural boundaries of the systems and their recursive self-refer-
entiality. It claims that law is incapable of stepping beyond its own lim-
its. The autopoietic approach is not normative in this respect. From its
perspective, the operational closure of the legal system is a statement of
fact.31 Even if a legal norm explicitly refers to the authority of morality
or any other system of social norms, this reference is always a) repudi-
able; b) a decoding proxy, which transfers the non-legal into the legal
and c) predetermined by the natural limits and capacities of the system
to digest the referred norms.
It should be clarified at this point that Raz’s normative scepticism in
relation to the ability of moral principles to be incorporated into the law
does not conflict with the systems theory’s claim that law can only incor-
porate morality through its decoding sensors. Indeed, in the latter case,
what is in fact incorporated into the legal system immediately acquires
its legal attributes. Raz objects to the ability of a set of moral or other
non-legal norms – as well as foreign legal norms – to be considered as
law. Autopoiesis suggests the same conclusion, albeit using another
method. While inclusive positivism acknowledges incorporation by a
legal norm, which either directly or implicitly recognises the primacy of
morality, the autopoietic theory perceives the incorporation as the con-
stant process of decoding and what is being incorporated never remains
extra-legal.
To illustrate this point it would be useful to refer to Allan Hutchin-
son’s imaginary state ‘Gileban’ – a theocracy, ruled arbitrarily in camera
by the dogmas of the Old Testament.32 Hutchinson correctly claims that
Gileban remains a legal polity and incorrectly (for the purposes of my
argument) concludes that this demonstrates that “legal validity can
sometimes and, on occasion, must be determined by reference to its con-
tent or in terms of its larger moral legitimacy”.33 An inclusive positivist
would agree with this conclusion: law in this case would be seen as
being either partially or totally substituted by religious norms and since
either direct or implicit substitution has been recognised by the legal
system, there is no way back. This is a typical instance of Faustian Pact.
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33 Ibid., p. 52.
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However, even assuming that Gileban’s Old Testament had totally re-
placed secular law, this would not negate the very existence of secular
law in Gileban, but only transfer its authority to the Old Testament. All
agree that there is no lawless society. Even in totalitarian dystopias peo-
ple are born and die, get married and divorced, manage their property
and commit criminal offences. All these legally relevant facts can be
regulated by a general or detailed corpus of religious norms, but the na-
ture of this regulation remains juristic even if supplemented by the
sacral statement that “this transaction is authorised in the name of god”.
This entails that, in spite the willingness of the rulers to commit them-
selves to the Faustian Pact, they cannot escape the communicative dis-
crepancies between religious and legal norms, even though both are con-
tingently contained in the same corpus – the Old Testament. If the same
rationale is embedded in a constitutional norm saying that “nothing in
this constitution can be ever changed or amended”, this would only lead
to some logical impossibility, but not to a factual one (I revert to the fac-
tual right now).
Another version of Gileban is more plausible: namely, the situation
where both secular and religious norms coexist, while being at the same
time transposed into the parallel system of public law via proper legal
proxies.34 In this scenario all the factual authority belongs to and derives
from the Old Testament, but the purely legal decisions are made by some
secular ersatz-laws. This secular law would probably contain an explicit
clause, recognising the moral and legal primacy of the Old Testament
and subordinating all legal decisions to the religious dogmas. The consis-
tency of this scenario with the premises of exclusive legal positivism and
the autopoietic theory of law is even more explicit. The ultimate deci-
sions are made – though pro forma only – by the public authority and it
is a legal authority, even if the legal authority coincides with or is fully
subordinated to the religious authority.
Structurally, the Giliban situation perfectly corresponds to any mature
democratic system too. The latter always refers to some universal moral
values, which are either directly or implicitly present in the basic laws of
these countries. What is valid, however, is not the content of these moral
or religious values, but their legal reflection and incorporation in legal
sources.35 To be clear, the incorporation claim of autopoiesis is not inclu-
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sivist, because no law can commit the Faustian Pact, renouncing its au-
topoietic nature and accepting the hierarchical guidance of another nor-
mative system. The Pact is null and void even if a legal clause explicitly
states otherwise.36 Otherwise, the all-inclusive provisions of a charter of
rights and liberties would be directly applicable by the individual right
holders, trumping the provisions of public law. This clause can be made
explicitly in law. Any individual activity conducted in conformity with
the provisions of such a charter would automatically be considered
above the law. In a situation where almost all imaginary individual inter-
ests are in one form or another embedded in some right or liberty, this
would lead to normative libertarian anarchism; which is impossible even
if the relevant clause is adopted by law itself and will be always miti-
gated by legal practice.
If a democratic polity subordinates its public activities to the prin-
ciples of an external system of social norms (e.g. moral norms, interna-
tional or foreign law), strictly abiding not only by the norms themselves,
but also by the steering interpretations of these norms, as issued by some
external authority (e. g. international or foreign court, United Nations,
Patriarch or Pope), each and every act of application and obedience is
decoded into the legal system, tested for its compatibility with this sys-
tem and only then transposed openly or implicitly into the law. It may be
a matter of milliseconds or automaticity – this does not change the prin-
ciple that the law cannot be refused the real or hypothetical possibility
of withdrawing its consent to obey the external system at any moment.
At the moment when such disobedience becomes impossible even hy-
pothetically, the law would lose its factual authority and deprive itself
from the necessary features of law (like the law of a government in exile
or the law of a colonised country). In other words, I imply the factual
impossibility of monistic application of international law. Its dualism is
always implied even if formally it is not necessarily the case.
Schematically, the situation is very similar to a game, and this shows
the potential for the use of different game-based theories (and not only
mathematical game theory sensu stricto) in legal analysis. An individual
participating in a game voluntarily conforms to its rules. These rules
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morality, not the immorality itself, that bears on the action’s legality. Immorality
itself never affects legality; only authoritative determinations of immorality are
capable of doing so. Cruel punishments, in other words, do not per se violate the
Eighth Amendment. What violate the Eighth Amendment are punishments that
have been authoritatively determined to be cruel. Or so says the exclusivist.”
36 I obviously do not say that the clause as such is null and void, but only sug-
gest that its normative reference to another system of social norms will be either
rejected by law’s internal immune system or digested by it, transforming the mor-
ality of the clause into its legality.
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may require him to act against his own will. Any disobedience to the
prescribed conduct leads to sanctions. Any individual, however, can stop
playing at any moment.37 This can be in conformity with the rules of the
game, or against them. In the latter case the withdrawal is punishable.
The individual can – in accordance with the rules of the game – accept
the punishment as a precondition for her withdrawal from the game or
reject it outright. The violation of the game’s rules does not affect the
general status of the individual, but can substantially affect his former,
current or future status as a player in this or other games. Law, as a sys-
tem of social norms, often plays such games with other normative sys-
tems. It can, for example, declare every immoral conduct illegal. As long
as it is willing to continue the game, it will punish every immoral con-
duct, up to the point where this practice causes significant negative con-
sequences for the legal system itself (e. g., to the legal certainty, enforce-
ability or efficaciousness of the legal system). Then it can withdraw from
the game (of morality or public international law) at any moment, re-
gardless of its previous commitments, and even break them explicitly.
And my argument is that the mere availability of this option implies
law’s internal primacy over other social norms (the other norms perceive
their internal sovereignty in exactly the same manner). The fact that this
situation hardly occurs does not undercut its possibility or diminish its
significance. Sometimes the obligations under the game’s rules extend
beyond the limits of the game (a semi-criminal play-debt situation,
where a gambling debt is considered as a debt of honour), and the indi-
vidual is deemed responsible even after explicitly cancelling his partici-
pation in the game.38 This situation is a typical Faustian Pact – the
model, which corresponds to the argument of inclusive legal positivism.
From an autopoietic perspective, such a situation is impossible because
it cannot accept that a game becomes the irretrievable reality; and – at
least semantically – all promises can always be breached. In other words,
the primary objective of every system of social norms is its self-mainte-
nance. Even if the system explicitly subordinates itself to another norma-
tive system, the consequences of such subordination are always cancelled
or mitigated by the system’s own internal immune system. This prevents
the adoption of a Faustian Pact for law contrary to law’s own will. The
incapacity of the football (to avoid another homonymy I should specify,
‘the soccer’) administrative authorities to resolve disputes in civil courts
constitutes a more obvious example of this phenomenon than the rela-
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tions between law and morality (or international law).39 But in any event
the immune system or the internal rationale of social systems always
protects the interests of these systems, in the face of a risk of (self-)de-
struction of the system.
Likewise, the presence of the formal or factual possibility to raise a
hypothetical disagreement prevents the vanishing of domestic sovereign-
ties and their transformation into a meta-state under the UN umbrella.40
While the presence of the formal possibility of disagreement does not
eliminate the ultimate primacy of the domestic law semantically, the fac-
tual ability to oppose the unanimous decision of all foreign countries em-
bedded in some binding UN resolution does not prevent the states from
disobeying. The moment, when the factual ability becomes impossible
at least hypothetically – the law of the country ceases its legal features
transferring from the overthrown regime to the new authority. The tran-
sitional moment of lawlessness is a theoretical construct. In reality there
might be no such gap or the gap would be immediately closed by the
new legal system retroactively, under some form of legal succession. The
new regime, for its part, should automatically acquire the state’s hy-
pothetical ability to disagree (either formally, factually or both). Other-
wise, it cannot be considered as an independent state being in a par in
parem relation with other states. The fact that most states never de-
nounce their commitments under international law or their adherence to
universal moral values (domestic law can explicitly declare that both
have some primacy over all other domestic norms) does not undercut the
factual, organic primacy of domestic law.
To sum up, according to the autopoietic and exclusivist theories, on the
normative side, law cannot step beyond its cognitive borders. Even if the
primacy of morality or international law is explicitly accepted by the
law itself, this primacy is fictitious, since it is always in the formal or
factual capacity of every legal system to cancel this primacy – an option
that jusnaturalism explicitly denies, and that inclusive positivism op-
poses provided that the relevant clause is accepted by the law itself (the
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39 In the case of football, no club that has been unfairly treated by ‘football law’
can file an action outside the specialised sports courts, because the integrity of
professional football as a social system would be jeopardised. This requirement of
the football’s immune system can be (and probably is) very disputable from a legal
perspective (exactly in the same manner as some legal norms may be disputable
from the perspective of morality, economics, politics, religion or sports). But the
illegality of this prohibition does not directly affect the functionality of the foot-
ball’s immune system (although it can have some influence on it, through decod-
ing).
40 I do not intend to irritate international lawyers: what I am saying should be
treated from the perspective of law’s autopoietic programming, and perceived as
an analytical argumentation, and not as a parochial normative claim.
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Faustian Pact). On the analytical side, even the non-cancelled subsump-
tion of law to other social systems has its factual or organic limits, as put
forward by the autopoietic theory of law.41
IV. Dialectics in Legal Interpretation and Argumentation
One would be mistaken in reducing exclusivism and autopoiesis to the
mechanistic closeness of legal systems or to solipsism. Law constantly
interacts with other social systems, being in a state of permanent mutual
exchange and transformation. The borders between the systems are strict
and explicit only at the analytical level, as a necessary condition for
theoretical assumptions. The normative aspects of this analytical as-
sumption entail that neither morality nor any other normative system
can guide a legal system (exclusivism). On the epistemological side, mor-
ality cannot be incorporated into the law without special decoding pro-
cedures and beyond the factual capacity of the legal system to absorb the
suggested moral imperatives (autopoiesis). Both normative and epistemo-
logical sides of these analytical premises are inseparably connected. In
practice, however, social systems lose their rigidity, gaining flexibility
and elasticity in the process. In real life the borders between social sys-
tems are hardly visible. Often the arguments from one system predict,
legitimise and substantiate the non-/reliability of another. In stable so-
cieties, economic, moral, legal, religious and political norms are not only
compatible with each other in general, but they are usually mutually
supportive and reinforcing.
The general compatibility between social systems creates an illusion of
overall harmonious holistic coherence, leading to a perception of any at-
tempt to articulate the differences between them as scholastic: “What’s
the point in explicating their theoretical separateness if all the systems
are eventually united in practice?” I do not intend to further elaborate
upon the theoretical premises of exclusivism and autopoiesis, hoping
that what has been said so far generally fits the Kelsenian and Razian
types of exclusivism and Luhmann’s and Teubner’s types of autopoiesis.
It is beyond the ambits of this paper to explore the important differences
within and between these different paradigms.42 I intend instead to ex-
plore how these two approaches address the practical problem of the de-
cision-making process – namely, the issue of legal interpretation taking
place primarily in courts, demonstrating thereby the importance of both
approaches not only at the analytical level of theoretical argumentation,
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12/6/15 12:54  Rechtstheorie, Duncker (21116_Andriychuk.3d (E)) 21 
but also in real life situations. As it is usually the case in jurisprudential
discussion, I am primarily interested in hard cases, while acknowledging
that every legal case contains some elements of hardness and that what
distinguishes a hard case from simpler instances is defined in terms of
proportionality and not on the basis of some classification.
Exclusive legal positivism is usually said to be sceptical to the role
legal interpretation plays in deciding legal cases: in plain cases there is
no need for interpretation, in hard cases the judge may find himself in a
position where no answer is given by positive law and the creation of a
new rule becomes necessary. Assuming that this stylised thesis reflects
the basic positions of exclusivism, two scenarios are possible. Both ex-
clude the necessity to apply morality to make up for the existing legal
lacunas. The first scenario is descriptive, the second functional. The
descriptive scenario is open to criticism from various non-positivist ap-
proaches to law. It essentially reflects Ronald Dworkin’s semantic sting
argument.43 It relies on the common or, as Dworkin puts it, ‘preinter-
pretative’ understanding of the word ‘law’. I will not analyse here the
numerous counter-arguments raised against the ‘semantic sting’ argu-
ment,44 assuming that all non-positivists agree that law in its semantic,
literal sense differs from what it should be from the perspective of mor-
ality. Nobody denies that a formally valid legal norm can deviate from
the principles of morality:45 not all laws are morally good laws; some are
morally bad law – at least observationally. The practical importance of
the semantic argument should not be underestimated and trivialised
since it often brings about very important legal consequences. The argu-
ment from semantics, however, provides a satisfactory answer only to
those exclusivists, who adhere to a monosemic nature of law – namely,
that law has the meaning, which ought to be properly (most often, me-
chanically) discovered and applied. Such an uncritical statutory obedi-
ence to law is neither the main, nor even a dominant strand of exclu-
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43 R. M. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, London, 1986, pp. 102–104.
44 J. Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison,
in: Legal Theory 4 (1998), pp. 249–250; Brian Leiter, Realism, Hard Positivism, and
Conceptual Analysis, in: Legal Theory 4 (1998), p. 535; Michael S. Green, Does
Dworkin Commits Dworkin’s Fallacy?: A Reply to Justice in Robs, in: Oxford
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45 J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford 2011, p. 364; M. C. Mur-
phy, in: Natural Law Jurisprudence 9 (2003), p. 245: “Finnis, George, and Soper
have charged that the lex iniusta non est lex slogan expresses an absurd view –
[. . .] that carries its self-contradiction out in the open and hence should not be
considered an accurate statement of the natural law position. Finnis has argued
that the natural law motto that unjust law is not law is, construed literally, ‘pure
nonsense, flatly self-contradictory’; [. . .] Soper has written that ‘the very obvious-
ness of this contradiction’ shows that no one could ever have meant to affirm the
strong natural law thesis.”
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sivism. The vast majority of exclusivists adhere to a poly- and not to a
mono-semic nature of law.
My main interest is also in this second, functional, polysemic, scenario,
which, unlike the previous one, does not use the apagogical argument in
order to defend the self-reference of law, but claims the universal nature
of such self-reference. In other words, it claims more than the fact that
in some (wicked) systems law and morality diverge. Its main task is to
show that legal systems are always separate from morality, even if the
reference to morality, religion, economics or international law is expli-
citly proclaimed by the laws themselves. The explication of this argu-
ment will also show that even wicked legal systems have some important
links with the dominant morality in society at the time. I should mention
this side effect only cursorily, to demonstrate that the coherence of the
law with the dominant morality does not guarantee the existence of a
democratic or humanistic law: morality itself is very susceptible to pub-
lic manipulations and propaganda, and its imposition on the law as a
benchmark of humanity does not solve the problem of wicked legal sys-
tems, since these wicked systems often refer to the realm of morality be
it in its secular or divine incarnation.
Reverting to the functional argument, in deciding genuinely hard cases
judges do not necessarily create a new law. Indeed, a judge can create a
new legal norm, but most often her task is to interpret the existing set of
legal norms in a way which extends their validity to the hard case. Two
main points need to be explained: (1) whether legal interpretation goes
beyond the realm of the law, referring to the principles of morality/poli-
tical necessity/economic rationality; and (2) what is the essence of hard
cases. In the following subsections I will address these two issues in
turn.
But I should start with a remark on methodology. It has been demon-
strated that neither autopoiesis nor exclusivism denies the importance of
the interaction and mutual influence between law and other social
norms. The type of exclusivism, which I would like to put forward in
this paper, can be labelled dialectical positivism. Dialectics as a method
of analysis operationalises the dynamic, interactive and productive na-
ture of conflicts between the explored phenomena and within each of
these phenomena. Three main elements of dialectics are of particular
interest for legal scholars: (i) dialectics of quality and quantity (also
known as dialectics of in-/commensurability of values) – this aspect of
dialectics is a very effective method of analysis of the mechanics of bal-
ancing in adjudicative proceedings. I will not address this theme here,
being interested in the remaining two aspects: (ii) dialectics of the mate-
rial and ideal elements of law (which will be elaborated in Subsection 1/
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IV in order to show how exclusivism can address the problem of inter-
pretation without reverting to morality) and (iii) dialectics of accentua-
tion and relativisation – the method which I will apply in Subsection 2/
IV to analyse legal argumentation in hard cases.46
1. Exclusivism, Autopoiesis and Legal Interpretation
Let me explain what I mean by the dialectics of the material and the
ideal. Legal idealism has several established meanings in jurisprudence:
it can refer to some implicit values, embedded in law;47 ideal systems
which motivate the law (like Roman law)48 or to political ideology.49 All
of them imply non-positivism, stressing the importance of morality for
law or, as Sean Coyle puts it, “to be understood as the opposite of legal
positivism”.50 My dialectical approach to legal idealism is different, since
it belongs to exclusive positivism. It argues that every system of social
norms in general, and every social norm in particular has its material
and ideal dimension. The material and ideal components imply that be-
fore applying any norm – even the most trivial and unequivocal ones –
the applicants and enforcers should contemplate some kind of its evalua-
tion. I will not discuss here the quite common perception of positivism as
a theory which either ignores or diminishes the importance of legal inter-
pretation. Hopefully, the explication of the dialectics of the material and
the ideal will be sufficient to demonstrate the opposite. Besides, I will
not address the difference between the terms meaning and interpreta-
tion,51 or the difference between a mere interpretation and the creation
of a new norm, taking as a matter of (stylised) fact that either of these
24 Oles Andriychuk
46 This is the only meaning I attach to dialectics, and I would like to dissociate
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three possibilities should necessarily occur: (i) the literal understanding
of the norm; (ii) the interpretation of the norm, taking place within its
established ambits; or (iii) the creation of a new norm. The third case is
the most consistent with the exclusivist premises of the judge’s role as
a law-maker. This case may only require application of the suggested
theory of dialectical positivism at the broadest level: the created norm
should usually correspond with the general gist of the legal system
within which it is created. If it is not to be the case, and the norm is
adopted by a judge voluntaristically, it remains valid according to the
exclusivist perception of law, but dialectical positivism will not need to
address it.
In any case, my main interest lies in the first two situations, namely,
(i) in the literal interpretation (i. e. interpretation as understanding) and
(ii) in the creative interpretation (i. e. interpretation which goes beyond
the originalist intentions, but remains within the factual ambits of the
legal norm and does not require the creation of a new norm). I argue that
in both cases the norm which is being interpreted has a material and
ideal dimension. The material dimension could be described as what the
norm says, while the ideal dimension reflects what the norm should say
or rather what does what is said by the norm mean. This ‘what it should
say’ does not go beyond the borders of the ‘what it says’; hence, the ideal
and material dimensions are dialectically connected through the constant
tension of checks-and-balances. In other words, the ideal should is to be
understood not as an external imperative (how we think the legal norm
ought to be interpreted), but as an internal requirement of the normative
system, within which the norm is being interpreted and an internal ratio-
nale of the norm itself. This should of the ideal is always predetermined
by the given is of the material, and is therefore related to the internal
can and not to the external ought to. This is the feature of the dialectical
positivism which distinguishes it from the dialectical non-positivism
developed by Robert Alexy. Its premises sound very similar: Alexy also
speaks of “the dialectic of the real and the ideal”,52 arguing that law has
a dual nature, but these two theories support fundamentally different
understandings of the law. Alexy’s dialectical non-positivism perceives
the real dimension of law as “represented by the elements of authorita-
tive issuance and social efficacy, whereas the ideal dimension finds its
expression in the element of moral correctness”.53 Conversely, dialectical
positivism understands the ideal dimension as embedded into the legal
norm itself. For the former the morality (and/as justice) is an inevitable
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component of law, its sine qua non condition,54 while for the latter it is
alien to the law.
For dialectical positivists the ideal dimension of any legal norm pre-
vents its literary, mechanistic application, while its material dimension
keeps the norm within its factual borders, protecting it from self-canni-
balisation (that is, from the situation where a norm steps beyond its
meaning, transforming itself into another norm). The idea is impossible
without the matter, and the matter is impossible without the idea. Epis-
temologically, they constitute the inevitable components of any physical
and social phenomenon. Building upon what has been said above, the
reason why law cannot search for its ideal dimension outside its own
realm – in morality, economic rationality or political necessity – should
become clearer: the ideal dimension is inevitably present in every norm.
Any economic, political, religious or moral norm is endowed with the
same dialectical structure. This claim is the central point of dialectical
positivism that I would like to emphasise. The universal nature of the
dialectics of the ideal and the material implies that every norm, regard-
less of its contents, contains both dialectical elements. This entails three
fundamental consequences, which should clarify the position of dialecti-
cal positivism. The first consequence is of normative nature. It disproves
the perception that both badly adopted laws and laws adopted with bad
intentions lack the ideal dimension. The ideal as perceived by dialectical
positivism is neither a prescription, something which should be achieved,
nor an imaginative construct, something which we would like to achieve,
while knowing that it is impossible in the real world. In other words, the
ideal is an epistemological and not an axiological concept. The ideal is
inherently present in any norm and in any system of social norms. This
explains the second consequence, namely, that not only every legal, but
also every moral norm has a material and ideal dimension. For this rea-
son, morality should not be understood as something which explains the
law, guiding its development, or an imperative dimension of what the
real law should be. Morality is not an ideal component of the law. It is
disentangled from the law and exists in parallel with it, sharing the
same structural problems and dilemmas. The third consequence comes
from the first two: the ideal and material elements of a norm do not cor-
respond to the written-unwritten criterion. It would be a mistake to
claim that a written norm is a material norm, and an unwritten norm an
ideal norm. Any norm, regardless of its presence or absence in written
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sources, inevitably contains both ideal and material aspects. One cannot
imagine a purely ideal norm, because the very act of such imagination
already embodies this norm, providing it with a material dimension. Con-
versely, every written norm, regardless of its content, apart from its ma-
terial dimension has also its ideal dimension, which encompasses its un-
derstanding and/or/as its interpretation. The ideal therefore is a qualify-
ing feature of the norm (i. e. is it a norm or not), and not its classifying
attribute (i. e. is it a good/achievable norm or not): every legal norm – be
it wicked or virtuous – has it.
The dialectics of the material and the ideal can be extrapolated to
Plato’s allegory of the cave: the material aspect of a norm (be it legal,
moral, religious or any other norm) is seen in how the real objects are
embedded in our immediate perception, while the ideal aspects are the
invisible (to us) objects themselves (and not some super-objects, which
predetermine the existence of the mere-objects – as is the case with the
morality’s guiding force in Alexy’s dialectical non-positivism). In the
next subsection I will demonstrate the role of judges, who – following
Plato’s allegory – can be seen as Philosophers kings, who decide upon the
ideal dimension of law. The task of the competing parties in adjudicative
proceedings is in this respect to convince the judges that the parties’ own
interpretation of the ideal dimension is the most appropriate one. The
discrepancy between the material and the ideal can never be totally
eliminated: otherwise, the very principle of dialectics would be de-
stroyed. Therefore, every judicial decision is potentially contestable,
which explains why I will also deal in the following subsection with the
issue of the ‘bounded arbitrariness’ of judges.
2. The Essence of Hard Cases and the Mechanics of Legal Argumentation
The articulation of the ideal dimension of law reveals how the dialecti-
cal version of exclusive legal positivism strengthens the separation thesis
without reducing the concept of law to legalistic black-latter jurispru-
dence. This approach, however, might seemingly undermine some prac-
tical exclusivist premises in respect to legal argumentation. If the ideal
dimension belongs to law, and every judge is required to discover the
proper meaning of any law by revealing this ideal dimension, does it not
decrease legal certainty? Do these revealed aspects of the ideal dimension
of legal norm exhaust all other possible interpretations? Can the ideal
dimension be ultimately discovered by the judge in its entirety? All these
problems predetermine the importance of the second aspect of the dialec-
tical positivism, namely the dialectics of accentuation and relativisation.
This method operationalises another dialectical polarity: the deontologi-
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cal formalism of what is and the pluralistic relativism of what ought to
be, attributing the former to legal officials and the latter to the parties in
the case. This helps to combine the necessity to maintain legal coherence
with the inevitability of competing interpretations. It establishes the dia-
lectical tension between the conflicting premises that a) every procedu-
rally correct judicial decision is binding and b) that every serious legal
interpretation of the parties, which has not been accepted by the court,
still belongs to the domain of the law. The former claim is in conformity
with exclusive positivism; the latter derives from the theory of legal
autopoiesis, and implies that while the ideal dimension of law does not
require the morality trump to solve legal cases, it shows that law is not
monosemic (i. e. does not have only one meaning, established by courts).
First, I should clarify the aspects of hard cases which are of particular
importance for dialectical positivism. The discussion of hard cases has a
long pedigree in legal theory. Its contemporary version has been shaped
by the debate between H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin.55 Its main con-
cern is related to the question whether judges have discretion in deciding
legal cases, whose solution is not made sufficiently explicit by the exist-
ing law. In its stylised form the discussion can be reduced to the oppo-
sition between those who suggest that judges are entitled to create new
law and those who argue that judges have to refer to the principles of
morality, which are above the law (but not necessarily beyond the law).
As the tonality of this paper might suggest, dialectical positivism con-
tains elements of both stylised positions. It accepts that if neither seman-
tic nor creative interpretations of a legal norm (or the system of legal
norms) permits to apply the existing law to the case, the judge creates
the law – and this explains the exclusivist roots of dialectical positivism.
It concentrates, however, primarily on situations where such interpreta-
tion is possible, arguing – not unlike postmodern non-positivist theories
– that the solution suggested by the judge as a lawmaker reveals only a
tip of the iceberg created by hard cases. As an exclusive positivist theory,
the dialectical approach does not accept morality as a remedy for solving
hard cases, but it acknowledges the importance of non-positivist theories
in elucidating most difficulties related to hard cases.
I have nothing to add to the response of exclusivism to those rare si-
tuations where neither legal norm nor the system of legal norms can pro-
vide the necessary substantiation for the case, which endows the judge to
create a new law. My main interest in hard cases is different. I think that
genuine hardness does not occur in cases where no legal answer is avail-
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able, but on the contrary in situations where more than one legal answer
can be offered. Unlike the ‘no-clear-answer’ perception of hard cases, its
‘more-than-one-answer’ version is ubiquitous. As Lord Macmillan
famously suggested, “[i]n almost every case, except the very plainest, it
would be possible to decide the issue either way with reasonable legal
justification.”56 The ubiquity of the difficult cases shows that the crea-
tion of new laws constitutes only a tiny part of the judges’ discretion in
deciding non-plain cases. If in most cases both parties have a reasonable
legal justification, some elements of arbitrariness are present in judicial
decisions. However, arbitrariness is constrained by many institutional
limits,57 and is this sense it is a bounded arbitrariness (by analogy with
and in opposition to the term ‘bounded rationality’,58 popular in econom-
ics and other social sciences – the claim that every rational choice is in-
evitably predetermined to some extent by such factors as limited infor-
mation, cognitive limitations and subjective, non-rational preferences).59
Luhmann emphasises the contingent nature of decision, suggesting that
“it cannot really be disputed that any decision could have been made
differently”,60 and arguing for the inevitability and productive nature of
epistemological paradoxes.61
If judicial cases are ultimately decided with some bounded arbitrari-
ness, parties have to present their arguments in the way that is the most
suitable to the formal requirements of the law. It would be hard to deny
that personal, subjective elements (like the judge’s breakfast) as well as
morality/political necessity/economic rationality always play some role
in adjudication, yet those extra-legal elements should either be decoded
Exclusive Legal Positivism and Legal Autopoiesis 29
56 Lord Macmillan, Law and Other Things, Cambridge 1937, p. 38. Similar
point has been made by numerous other thinkers. E.g. H. Kelsen, On the Theory
of Interpretation, in: Legal Studies 10 (1990), p. 130: “In terms of the positive law
there is simply no method according to which only one of the several readings of a
norm could be distinguished as ‘correct’”; A. T. Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in
the Age of Balancing, in: The Yale Law Journal 96 (1987), p. 943: “In almost all
conflicts, especially those that make their way into a legal system, there is some-
thing to be said in favour of two or more outcome.”
57 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Second Edition, Oxford 1994, p. 273.
58 H. A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational, Wiley Publishing, Oxford
1957.
59 Dworkin, The Model of Rules (note 55), p. 32: “Discretion, like the hole in a
doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of re-
striction.” O. M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, in: Stanford Law Review 34
(1982), p. 739: “Interpretation, whether it be in the law or literary domains, is
neither a wholly discretionary nor a wholly mechanical activity.”
60 N. Luhmann, Legal Argumentation: An Analysis of its Form, in: Modern Law
Review 58 (1995), p. 285.
61 N. Luhmann, Deconstruction as Second-Order Observing, in: New Literary
History 24 (1993), p. 770; Teubner, Introduction (note 2), pp. 1–2. (I will not address
in this paper the epistemological nature of legal paradoxes and their correlation
with the dialectical approach of law.)
12/6/15 12:54  Rechtstheorie, Duncker (21116_Andriychuk.3d (E)) 29 
into the legal language (since the judge is always cognitively dependent
on law),62 namely their suggested implications should always be em-
bodied in or substantiated by legal norm (providing thereby a legal
incarnation and legal meaningfulness to extra-legal concepts and im-
petuses) or trumped by the purely legal argumentation, at least from a
dialectical positivist view. Accordingly, the task of the parties is to offer
to the judge the most reliable interpretation of the existing law. Every
lawyer in courtroom is trying to actualise the ideal dimension of law,
showing its relevance to the case. She creates her own mosaic from nu-
merous potentially related smalts (norms and facts), aiming to match the
proposed constellation to the judge’s own understanding of the law. In
other words, the parties compete in the adversarial system for providing
judges with the best understanding of a legal norm and/or its place in
the overall system of legal norms. I do not exclude the possibility that
some extra-legal arguments may still influence the judges without being
either directly or implicitly decoded into the legal language or trumped
by purely legal argumentation, but I will not address this problem, since
it mostly belongs to the first dimension of the dialectics of law (dialec-
tics of quality/quantity), and I am only interested in the second (dialec-
tics of ideal and material) and the third (dialectics of accentuation and
relativisation) dimensions of this phenomenon.
So far I have touched upon three interrelated aspects of the dialectics
of accentuation and relativisation:
(1) The problem of elasticity of the law, which reveals that what usually
causes the difficulties in the courtrooms, is not the absence of an ap-
propriate legal norm, but the presence of different valid norms, at the
same hierarchical level as well as the availability of different reliable
interpretations of norm/s, which provide the judge with the possibi-
lity to decide the case either way. Another aspect of this problem re-
lates to the judges’ personality: different judges can decide identical
cases differently. A certain margin of appreciation exists in every
case, and the procedurally correct decisions are not deemed to be ille-
gal even if alternative options are available to the judge.
(2) These situations reveal the polysemic nature of norms, which shows
that almost all legal norms have potentially more than one legally sig-
nificant meaning. The very structure of norms is general, and an at-
tempt to include into the law all possible scenarios would be of no
more use than the creation of a comprehensive map with a ‘one to
one’ scale of the measured landscape. The implication of these two
characteristics can be illustrated using Lon Fuller’s classical case of
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the Speluncean Explorers,63 in which Fuller vividly and very convin-
cingly reveals the availability of numerous legal solutions for an ex-
tremely difficult (for some judges) and hard (for the others) case. The
rationale behind this invented case speaks for itself: an opinion of
every judge has the attributes of a legal opinion. The opinion, which
ultimately prevails in court (or, using Arthur Jacobson’s terminology,
“marks, franks, or tags as law”),64 is the factual or official legal opin-
ion (legal opinion sensu stricto), while alternatives ones are potential
or hypothetical legal opinions (legal opinions sensu largo). The posi-
tivist facets of dialectical positivism acknowledge only the legal opin-
ion sensu stricto, while its autopoietic part also tolerates the interpre-
tative importance of the remaining opinions, considering them useful
at least for future decoding practices.65 Such perception is compatible
with Hart’s paradigmatic example of the prohibition to park any ve-
hicle in a public park. Hart asks: “[p]lainly, this forbids an auto-
mobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles?”,66
and his answer shows the core and penumbral meanings of the norm.
All penumbral meanings, which are articulated by the parties with
sufficient strength, are accepted to be of potential relevance. The ele-
ments of bounded arbitrariness of the court constitute the only episte-
mological difference between them.
(3) Parties compete in the courtrooms for providing the judges with the
most meaningful interpretation of the positive law. The argumenta-
tion takes place for the best interpretation of the ideal dimension of a
norm, while all in general agree upon its material dimension. The
overall process is limited to the law exclusively. No elements of mor-
ality/economic rationality/political necessity can pass into the discus-
sion without their prior decoding into the language of law. Adversar-
ial judicial systems generally acknowledge the dynamic nature of law
as a discovery procedure, containing strong elements of the Hayekian
concept of competition.67 As Ernest Weinrib puts it, “[legal] creativity
[. . .] is essentially cognitive, and it is most naturally expressed in ad-
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judication conceived more as the discovery than as the making of
law.”68 Unlike the inquisitorial model of adjudication, this format
does not look for the ultimate truth, though its articulation is often
present in the rhetoric of parties and judges alike. This feature distin-
guishes dialectical positivism from essentialism: the former accepts
the conditionality of judicial decisions, while the latter (in an Hercu-
lean manner) seeks to discover the right answer. Practically, this im-
plies that in the vast majority of the 50/50 cases the parties with the
most skilful lawyers have much higher chances to win the case (the
probability changes proportionally mutatis mutandis). The main skill
of the lawyers in this respect is their ability to accentuate the friend-
liest interpretation of the ideal aspects of the norm, and relativise the
arguments of the opposing party by diminishing their relevance. The
outcome of the case would differ if the parties switched lawyers. I
should distinguish the suggested vision from legal realism, since un-
like the latter it does not trust in politics, but in law. The polysemy of
law is a descriptive statement. Normatively, each party tries to con-
vince the judge of the ultimate rightfulness of their own interpreta-
tion. In other words, for the observer, litigation is incarnated in plura-
listic positivism, while all the participants address the case as if they
were monistic positivists (Subsection 3/III).
Let me finally mention the aspect of the dialectics of accentuation and
relativisation concerned with the very process of creating the convincing
and sound argument: it represents a combination of the former three, but
unlike them deals mostly with the entire legal system, rather than with
specific legal norms. Although cases often explicitly refer to one or sev-
eral legal norms, the overall adjudicative process takes place within the
legal system as a whole. The specificity of each field of law does not pre-
vent the potential application of norms from another field. The situation
is either clearly or latently exists in every legal system and every histor-
ical period, but it is most visible in contemporary liberal democracies
and is connected to the powerful presence of the discourse of human
rights in numerous adjudicative contexts. The reliability and weight of
legal arguments depends to a large extent on the centre of gravity of the
case, and this decreases the ability of the parties to refer to some univer-
sal legal norm in every case, although such a possibility still exists.
Every argumentative strategy can be considered as a jurisprudential
cocktail of different norms, facts and reasons, prepared by lawyers to
match the requirements of positive law (I do not address the extra-legal
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ingredients of the cocktail, implying that most of them do not fit the ju-
dicial taste unless encoded into the realm of law, losing thereby their ex-
tra-legal qualities). The fact that most of the cases are based on several
norms (and not only one norm), with the implicit recognition of the en-
tire objectives of the legal system, increases in geometric progression the
polysemic essence of the law. The discovering process in litigation is di-
rected not only towards revealing the ideal dimension of a legal norm,
but also of the entire legal system. This, in turn, explicates the inevit-
ability of judges’ bounded arbitrariness and the importance of proper
legal interpretation and sound legal argumentation in any, even fairly
plain, case. The dialectics of accentuation and relativisation is the pro-
cess of perpetual discovery of law in every legal dispute. The winning
argument is the argument which has been sufficiently accentuated
against competing arguments, which were successfully relativised by this
argument. The perpetual nature of these dialectical tensions prevents the
discovery of ultimate answers. Judicial decisions are presumed to be cor-
rect for law as an autopoietic system. Yet, they can never be entirely cor-
rect at the meta-level. Law is satisfied with the conditional character of
this correctness, but it can tolerate different outcomes for similar cases
in future disputes. The dialectical angle of the synthesis of exclusivism
and autopoiesis reveals the ‘dynamic stability’69 of legal systems. Sta-
bility is articulated by exclusivism, dynamism is emphasised by auto-
poiesis. Dialectics seeks to unite exclusivism and autopoiesis into a
mutually-reinforcing theory without eliminating the important metho-
dological differences between the two.
Dialectical legal argumentation contains some elements of the other
two major types of argumentation, namely the logical and the rhetorical
argumentations, but it overcomes the mechanistic strictness of the for-
mer, while restricting the consequentialist opportunism of the latter. The
logical approach is based on clear and predictable logical laws. Only a
tiny and obsolete strand of exclusivism (namely, statutory positivism) is
associated to it. The rhetorical approach tries to internalise into legal
argumentation concepts coming from other social norms, often using
such broad, opaque and polyvalent terms as justice, equality, stability,
solidarity, or consumer welfare.70 While dialectical positivism perceives
critically any attempt to use extra-legal arguments for rhetorical pur-
poses, it tolerates some elements of rhetoric if applied within the legal
discourse itself, particularly as far as the competition in law’s discovery
procedure is concerned.
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gumentation 11 (1997) pp. 358–360.
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I would like to conclude by emphasising that nothing in the suggested
description of the theory of dialectical positivism should indicate that
the legal discourse is not self-referential. Neither morality nor any other
social system is inevitably present in this picture. Their presence is noth-
ing but homonymic contingency. The dialectical competition between dif-
ferent interpretations of legal norms takes place inside the law ex-
clusively. This explains why dialectical positivism provides a synergic
synthesis of exclusive legal positivism and legal autopoiesis on one hand,
and enables their harmonious coexistence with various interpretative
theories of law on the other.
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